Question Set 6

*Due **Friday December 4th** at 8pm — submit your work in PDF or Word format, through Canvas.*

Typical answers should be one paragraph per question. Starred questions carry double marks, and the answers may be two paragraphs. Be direct and to-the-point, using simple words and short sentences.

Dana Nelkin and Jonathan Vogel: Lotteries and Closure

1. State the Closure Principle for knowledge.

2. A *paradox* is a set of propositions that are individually plausible but jointly inconsistent. State the propositions that make up the lottery paradox (the knowledge or the justified belief version, whichever you prefer). What do you think the correct solution to the paradox is? (Pick one!) Briefly motivate your answer. *

3. Explain why the lottery paradox yields a potential counterexample to the Closure Principle.

4. Explain Vogel's "Car Theft" example. Do you agree with Vogel that this is analogous to the lottery case? Does that affect your response to the lottery paradox in any way?

Jane Friedman: Suspension of Judgment

5. A first response to Friedman's question "Why suspend judgment?" might be "Why not?" Explain how Friedman would respond — what does she take to be so puzzling about suspending judgment? (*Hint: the relevant section is §2.1*)

6. How does Friedman's account of suspended judgment as an inquiring attitude address this problem?

7. Why does Friedman think it is questions rather than propositions that are the objects of suspended judgment?

8. At the beginning of the paper, Friedman discusses the position of Sextus Empiricus, who held that we should always suspend judgment on every question. Given Friedman's account, there is something to be said for that position — after all, isn't it always good to be open to new evidence on any question? Illustrating your answer with concrete examples, give two reasons why it might sometimes be good to close an inquiry by forming a judgment. *

9. Write a four-sentence essay responding to a central claim in Friedman's article.*